In this paper, using two alternative methods, we investigate the contagion effects and systemic risk in China's commercial banks system based on the balance sheet data and the estimation on interbank exposures. First, we calculate various indicators in terms of the balance sheets of individual commercial banks to quantify contagiousness and vulnerability for China's banking system without considering the detailed topology of interbank networks. Second, we estimate the detailed bilateral exposures matrix of the interbank network to examine the domino effects and snowball effects of financial contagion. The simulation results from two alternative approaches are consistent. Both suggest that the contagious risk arising from an assumed bank failure is trivial in Chinese banking system, whereas the amplification effects of the losses due to the financial interlinkage are non-trivial. In particular, we identify the systemic important banks in terms of a relative contagion index and the measures capturing the topological features of the interbank networks, respectively.
Introduction
The "too connected to fail" (TCTF) problem in modern financial system has attained more and more concerns from academics and policymakers recently, because the financial interlinkages stemming from both asset and liability sides of financial institutions' balance sheets would spread and amplify the damage effects of various shocks by creating channels of financial contagion, and thereby yields systemic risk and financial disruptions at macro level. The interbank markets across the countries, especially in advanced economies, have been the focuses of the studies on financial contagion that could lead to systemic risk due to their typical financial interconnected structure 2 , whereby the systemic important financial institutions are identified and the insights for macroprudential regulation are developed. Concentrating exclusively on China's interbank markets in this paper, we investigate the topological features of China's banking system, and measure the systemic contagion effects of financial networks when a bank failure occurs under an idiosyncratic shock which wipes out its outside assets. Our study complements the existing literature by applying two alterative methodologies in assessing the contagion risk and identifying the systemically important banks, thereby sheds lights on the prevention of systemic risk and the implementation of macroprudential policy for China's financial stability.
Our study and the contributions to the literature can be summarized in several respects. First of all, following the methodology proposed by Young (2015, 2016) , we use the balance sheet data of China's commercial banks to examine the contagious effects and systemic risk in the interbank market without considering the detailed topological structure of Chines interbank markets. In doing so, we find that the probability of contagion arising from the failure of one bank is minimal or 2 See, the related literature in Section 2. almost impossible in terms of our sample. Nevertheless, the calculated multiplying factors show that the amplification effects of the losses stemming from a bank default through the channel of interbank interconnectedness are non-trivial, reaching approximately 2.73 times. Second of all, we define a relative contagion index, which is calculated in terms of the structural variables of a bank's balance sheet, reflecting the financial connectivity and the outside leverage of a bank, With this relative contagion index, we identify the systemic important banks in China. Third of all, we employ the maximum entropy approach to estimate the bilateral exposures matrix of the interbank network, and then analyse the topological features of Chinese banking system by applying k-clique, partitioning, and hierarchical clustering techniques. The results demonstrate that Chinese interbank network presents a typical core-periphery structure. In addition, we find that the network centrality coefficients of banks are significantly correlated with the interbank assets, interbank liabilities and total assets, and therefore closely connected with the abovementioned relative contagion index.
Fourth of all, we simulate the contagion effects and systemic risk with the estimated topological matrix by calculating the number of banks that default by contagion and the losses as a fraction of the total assets caused by an assumed bank failure due to an idiosyncratic shock. The simulation results in terms of the round-by-round algorithm show that, the contagious possibility of a bank failure through the interbank network is very low, whereas the losses amplified suffered from the bank failure through the interbank network are relatively high in China. Finally, our study illustrates that the simulation results from two approaches 3 are consistent. In sum, our empirical simulations suggest that the domino effects of financial contagion in Chinese banking system are trivial, whereas the amplification effects of financial contagion due to the 3 As abovementioned, one only uses the balance sheet data without considering the detailed topological structure, another one needs to estimate the bilateral exposures matrix. financial interconnectedness are non-trivial. Therefore, the systemic risk in Chinese interbank market should attain proper concern by the policymakers and prudential regulators.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the progress in related literature. Section 3 presents the data and the stylized facts of Chinese banking system. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 simulates the financial contagion and calculates the systemic losses arising from a bank default without considering the detailed topology of China's interbank networks. Section 6 investigates contagion risk and systemic losses through the transmission channels of estimated interbank networks. Section 7 makes the conclusive remarks.
Related Literature
In the aftermath the global financial crisis of 2008, there is growing interest in the analysis of financial contagion and the relevant systemic risk, particularly using network models. Banks are highly interdependent and closely linked together via bilateral exposures in the interbank market, forming a typical financial network, which promotes the efficiency of banking system by sharing the risk and reducing the costs on one hand, provides spreading and propagation channels of systemic risk within the financial system on the other hand. Thus, the interbank networks have commanded the attention of much of academic literature and have dominated the discussion on the financial instability and the macroprudential regulation.
In a foundational research, Allen and Gale (2000) show that the pattern of interconnectedness of the banking sector or the topological structure of interbank markets is crucial for the possibility of financial contagion. They suggest that a "complete" structure of interbank network enhance the ability of withstand shocks to the banking system than an incomplete structure, where every bank doesn't have symmetric linkages with all other banks in the financial system. Unfortunately, the actual structure of the interbank networks is unknown in most countries because national authorities and banks do not release the relevant data 4 . A solution to this problem is to estimate the adjacent matrix of the bilateral claims and obligations by maximum entropy in terms of bank balance sheet data. Following this methodology, vast studies on various interbank markets across countries contribute to the growing body of literature: Sheldon and Maurer (1998) for the Swiss banks; Upper and Worms (2004) for the German banking system; Boss et al. (2004) for the Austrian interbank market; Wells (2004) for the UK-resident banks; van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) for the Dutch banking sector; Elsinger et al. (2006a, b) for the Austrian banking system; Mistrulli (2011) for Italian interbank market. Although the maximum entropy method is optimal and extensively applied when the true network structure is unknown, some inherited drawbacks, in particular the assumption of complete interbank linkages, could lead to misleading results or biases because the real interbank networks are typically sparse and relationship-oriented. As such, alternative methods are developed for estimating the topological structure of interbank networks, including the transfer entropy method proposed by Li et al. (2013) , and the minimum density approach developed by Anand et al. (2014) . The former builds the interbank market structure by calculating the transfer entropy matrix using bank stock price sequences. The latter loads the most probable links with the largest exposures consistent with the total claims and obligations of each bank to produce the interbank network topology. Liang et al. (2016) find that the simulations based on the results from the transfer entropy and from the maximum entropy are consistent when applied to Chinese banking system. In contrast, Anand et al. (2014) show that the maximum-entropy method underestimates the contagion risk, whereas the minimum-density method may overestimate it when used in a stress-testing context.
A second methodology for investigating financial contagion in the interbank markets is proposed by Young (2015, 2016) , which assess the contagion risk without considering the detailed topology of the interbank networks, instead only use the balance sheets data including the aggregate bilateral exposures 5 .
Our study firstly employs their theorems to quantify the contagion risk and identify systemic important institutions for Chinese banking system, and then compare the results with the results from the simulation by estimating the topology of Chinese banks with the maximum entropy method.
Generally, network models examine the contagion and systemic risk by calculating the number of institutions that defaults by contagions and the losses as a fraction of the total assets that arise from an assumed bank default in the banking system. In simulating the effects of the financial contagion among a fraction of US banks, Furfine (1999 Furfine ( , 2003 firstly developed the round-by-round algorithm (or sequential default algorithm named by Upper, 2011) , in which a bank failure due to an idiosyncratic shock is assumed and then the losses of other banks that have exposures to the failed bank are calculated and compared with their capitals. If the losses are greater than its capital for any bank, the relevant bank fails and drops from consideration. The simulation is then iterated by assessing if banks fail in each round make other banks fail in later round, the iteration procedure continues until no bank failure. This algorithm is extensively employed by researchers 6 . A second algorithm is the fictitious defaults algorithm with the clearing vector proposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) , which investigate the path of contagion from the trigger to the first and higher rounds of contagion. The difference between two algorithms, according to Upper (2011) , lies in how to deal with the simultaneity problem. The round-by-round method does not consider the impact of higher order defaults on the losses of previously failed banks, whereas the fictitious defaults algorithm does. Our simulations in Section 6 follow the sequential default approach.
At least three mechanisms of financial contagion 7 through the banking networks have been observed and simulated in literature: the first is the "Domino effect" (the failure of a single bank can potentially trigger a whole chain of subsequent failures) or the knock-on effect through the direct spread channel of lending exposures in the interbank, which measures the possibility of contagion. The second is the "Snowball effect" or the amplification effect through the propagation of contagious damaging within interbank networks, which calculates the severity of contagion. The third one is the "Spiral effect" or fire sale externality, in which liquidity shortage in the interbank market caused by two abovementioned effects leads to the fire sale of banks' outside assets to satisfy the capital requirements and the interbank exposures, forcing the vicious fall in the price of assets and thus the losses-given-default, which introduces other banks to sell non-liquid assets under distress, eventually enhance a small shock into a spiralling chain of sales and losses by a positive feedback circle 8 .
The insights provided by the empirical works with network model include: first, the interbank network does affect the overall level of systemic risk within the financial system due to the spread and propagation effects of contagion in the system. Second, contagious risk occurs with low probability 9 in most economies but produces high costs once it happens. Third, the bank-specific features and the topological 7 See, a detailed discussion on the channels of financial contagion, for example, the survey by Upper (2011) . 8 See, for example, the discussions by Aldasoro et al. (2016) . 9 Cont et al. (2012) , however, show that the contagions are more frequent than previous studies when examining the actual the network structure of the Brazilian financial system. structure of interbank networks determine the transmission channels of financial contagion and thereby uncover the formation mechanism of systemic risk in the banking system, should therefore be attained more concerns by the policy makers and prudent regulators.
Data and China's Interbank Market
In broad terms, China's interbank markets consist of FX spot market, money market, bond market, and derivative market. This paper restricts it to the money market in which financial institutions conduct bilateral trading. The participants in China's interbank market contain policy banks, commercial banks, cooperatives, insurance companies, security companies, trustees, financial funds, and other financial companies. Given that commercial banks dominated the bilateral transactions in the interbank market and banking activities in China's banking sector ( Figure 1 presents China's banking sector), we focus on three categories of commercial banks in our study: 5 big state-owned commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks and 133 city commercial banks 10 . The total assets of these three types of commercial banks account for approximately 88.45% of the aggregate assets owned by all commercial banks, and account for approximately 69.14% of the assets owned by all banks. Our sample data of banks' balance sheet source from the Wind database (hereafter Wind) and China Banking Regulatory Commission (hereafter CBRC). Due to the data availability for 2015, 124 rather than 133 city commercial banks are adopted in our sample, besides all the big state-owned commercial banks and the joint-stock commercial banks. The total assets, total liabilities and net assets of the commercial banks are plotted in Figure 3 for the period of 2003-2015. The total assets, total liabilities and net assets grew by average annual rates at 51%, 49%, and 104% during 2003-2015, reaching 155,825.7, 144,268.2, and 11,557 .5 billion yuan at the end of 2015, respectively. 
Balance Sheets and Interbank Networks-Methodology
Following Allen and Gale (2000) , Young (2015, 2016) , the stylized balance sheet of an individual commercial bank i is depicted in Figure 6 , in which the bank's assets compose of the outside (interbank market) assets (denoted by i a ) and the interbank assets (denoted by More specifically, a weighted directed network 11 can be described by an adjacency matrix C with entries ij c , where ij c denotes the exposure of bank j towards bank i , or the claims that bank i towards bank j . For N banks, we have following adjacency matrix
where the sum of the elements in a given row : The balance sheets and the interbank topology provide a framework by which we can simulate the financial contagion and systemic events to prevent the occurrence of the financial fluctuation. In what follows, we will flesh out this framework with the balance sheets data and interbank structure of China's commercial banks, and then examine the contagion risk and systemic losses of Chinese banking system through the interbank channels of propagation and amplification subjects to an idiosyncratic shock by using two alternative approaches.
Measuring Contagion and Systemic Risk without Considering the Detailed
Interbank Structure Young (2015, 2016) developed the following theorems to assess the contagiousness and vulnerability of financial institutions without knowing the details of the entire interbank network structure.
distributed, and that the net worth of every vertex is initially nonnegative. Let D be a nonempty subset of vertices and let iD ∉ , contagion from i to D is impossible if
where i ρ denotes the financial connectivity of bank i , measured by the proportion of bank ' is liabilities to other entities in the financial system:
Note that the right-hand side of (1) is defined as contagion index of bank i by Glasserman and Young (2016) . The contagion index calculates the currency amount of bank ' i s obligations to other banks, and thus the potential impact on the rest of the banking system if i defaults. A higher contagion index implies that the relevant bank is more susceptible to failure (due to high leverage) that has large consequences (due to its size) and potentially large impacts on the rest of the banking system (due to its high financial connectivity) (Glasserman and Young, 2016) .
The total leverage of bank i (denoted by * i θ ) equals to its total asset divided by its net worth, producing * * ( )/ ,
The condition that bank j is relatively immune to a shock from bank i satisfy
Theorem 1 developed by Glasserman and Young (2015) implies that the financial contagion in a financial system depends on some critical parameters, such as the financial connectivity, the net worth, and the degree of leverage of bank i , rather than on the distribution of shocks or on the topology of the network. 
where i σ is the probability of default for bank i . If introducing the marginal probability of default σ , the
can be defined as the amplification factor of the financial networks.
Using the balance sheet data of China's commercial banks at the end of 2015, which are composed of 5 big state-owned commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks, and 133 city commercial banks 14 , we calculate the contagion indices for the banks and assess the contagion risk in China's interbank market. Table   1 in Appendix summarizes the results.
Columns 4-9 in Table 1 present the components of balance sheets of commercial banks. Column 10 calculates the proportion of bank liabilities to other entities in the financial system ( i ρ ), or the measurement of financial connectivity of banks. The ratios of interbank liabilities range from 0.00 to 0.42 with the average at 0.14, which is close to the average value at 0.149 for the 50 largest of European banks, estimated 13 IFR: increasing failure rate. In general a random variable with distribution function G and density g is said to
have an increasing failure rate (IFR) distribution if
is an increasing function of x . All normal, exponential, and uniform distributions are examples of IFR distributions (Glasserman and Young, 2016) . 14 Due to the data availability, only 115 city commercial banks are included in our sample.
by Glasserman and Young (2015) .
Column 11 reports the leverage of outside assets ( i θ ). The average of i θ is 13.68 for 132 Chinese commercial banks (ranging from 7.65 to 21.23), which is far lower than the average of i θ for the 50 largest of European banks at 24.9. This reflects that most Chinese commercial banks have sound capital adequacy ratios.
Columns 12 To estimate the amplification factor of Chinese interbank networks by applying Theorem 2, we assume the different scenarios for different marginal probabilities of defaults, given that the ρ + is 0.42 from Table 1 , the amplification factors in expression (4) are calculated and summarized in Table 2 . 
Simulating the Contagion and Systemic Risk with the Estimated Interbank

Structure
Because the actual data of bilateral exposures among China's commercial banks in the interbank market are unavailable, we employ the maximum entropy approach with iterative proportional fitting (IPF) algorithm 15 to estimate the interbank bilateral exposures 16 matrix from above bank balance sheet data, and then analyse topological structure of China's commercial banks linkages in Subsection 6.1. The simulation of contagion and systemic risk for china's banking system in terms of the estimated interbank topological structure is conducted and summarized in Subsection 6.2.
The Topological Features of China's Commercial Banks Networks
Obviously, the estimated network by the maximum entropy method produces a complete regular network 17 , in which every vertex (bank) is connected with every other vertex. Using k-clique 18 technology, firstly, we depict the topological structure marked with yellow colours, these are core-banks. Those banks whose transaction volumes are between 500 billion yuan and 1.5 trillion (lower than) yuan belong to the second cluster where the banks are marked with green colours; the banks in the third cluster with red colours have transaction volumes among 100 billion yuan and 500 billion (lower than) yuan; The banks in the second and third clusters belong to the semi-periphery. Those banks that are marked with blue colours in the fourth cluster hold transaction volumes between 10 billion and 100 billion yuan; the remaining 17 Discussions on a complete market structure of financial networks, see, for example, Allen and Gale (2000) . 18 A clique is a subnetwork with maximum density. 19 More characteristics about the core-periphery structure of financial networks, see, for example, Craig and von Peter (2010), Fricke and Lux (2012) .
banks with transaction volumes below 10 billion yuan in the fifth cluster are marked with orange colours. The banks in the latter two clusters are periphery banks. Note that the core-banks in the first cluster consists of the "big five" state-owned banks and the Industrial Bank Co. Ltd, which are identified as systemic important banks in terms of the relative contagion indices in Section 5. Figure 7 (c) plots the topological structure of the commercial banks that are also partitioned into 5 clusters in terms of their net worth, where the classification standards are: more than 1 trillion for yellow first cluster, from 100 billion to 1 trillion for green second cluster, among 10 billion and 100 billion for red third cluster, from 2 billion to 10 billion for the blue fourth cluster, and the fifth orange cluster for banks whose net worth below 2 billion yuan. Figure 7 (d Table 1 in Appendix). In addition, the centrality coefficients for the potential important banks (5 joint-stock banks including Nos. 6-9, 12) that are identified in Section 5 are between 0.02 and 0.05, and for non-systemic banks their coefficients are below 0.02. Therefore, the relative contagion index introduced in the paper does reflect the topological features of the commercial banks networks of China's interbank market.
Furthermore, we find that the centrality coefficients of banks are significantly correlated with the interbank assets, interbank liabilities and total assets, and therefore closely connecting with the relative contagion index (Table 3 ). This finding suggests that those banks that have more total assets and conduct more interbank transactions (a metrics represented by the sum of interbank assets and liabilities) generally play central roles in the interbank networks. This supports the conclusion from Glasserman and Young (2015) that without knowing the detailed topological structure we can identify the systemically important banks and quantify the contagion risk in terms of banks' balance sheet information 21 , especially in terms of the interbank transaction information. Moreover, it exhibits that the systemic significance of a bank does associate with the size of its balance sheet variables and its interbank position. 
Simulating Results of the Contagion and Systemic Risk with the Estimated
Interbank Networks
In this subsection, given the estimated network structure, we examine how the failure 21 See, also, Craig and von Peter (2010) , who show that the core-periphery positions of the banks can reliably be predicted by means of a regression that uses only balance sheet variables. That is, the observed interbank network structure is driven by factors that are reflected in bank balance sheets. of one or a certain banks impacts other banks' solvency via direct effects and chain reactions in the banking system, that is, assess the possibility of default cascades and the amplification effects of potential contagion by simulation. In the simulation process, we assume that banks cannot react to any shock by, for example, raising capital or getting bail-outs from the governments to compensate for the losses suffered from the failure of their interbank counterparts. Considering the special situations of Chinese banking system, where most commercial banks are state-owned or the dominating shareholders are governments, we define a bank failure when its losses in assets exceed its net worth, in contrast with the previous studies in which the bank default refers to the scenario that the losses in assets exceed its Tier 1 capital.
Our simulation methodology follows Furfine (2003) and Upper and Worms (2004) . They examine the possibility of contagion by letting banks go closeness one at a time and calculate the number of banks that fail due to their exposures to the failing bank. Specifically, we consider the following three failure scenarios 22 For simplicity, we assume that both the rate of loss given default (LGD, denoted by δ ), and the external capital loss (denoted by µ , due to the fire sale externality) are constant. The methodology of the round-by-round algorithm can be described by the following steps:
A. By assumption an initial bank i defaults. B. Any bank j defaults if its losses suffered from the bilateral exposures versus the Bank i and from the external equity loss exceed its net worth.
The default condition for the first round contagion is given by:
C. In a possible second round of contagion, any bank k defaults if its losses suffered from the bilateral exposures versus the Bank i and the bank j and from the external equity loss exceed its net worth. So the default condition for the second round of contagion is
D. Contagion stops if no further bank defaults. Otherwise, the third round of contagion occurs. This process continues until no additional bank defaults.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the number of bank defaults and total losses of banking system under three assumed scenarios for the different values of LGD ratio and external capital loss coefficients. Column 1 in Tables 4 and 5 presents the initial defaulted bank, whereas columns 2 to 7 report the total number or the total losses of the defaulted banks arising from financial contagion for respective LGD ratio and external equity loss coefficients. Table 4 suggests that the probability of contagion within Chinese banking system is minimal even if the initial failed bank is the biggest bank around the world with a 100% LGD ratio. This result is consistent with the results that we obtained in Section 5 following the method provided by Glasserman and Young (2016) , in which the detailed topological structure of the banking system is not considered in assessing the possibility of financial contagion.
The intuitions underpinning our results in which a failure of one systemic important bank does not trigger the cascade of bank failures in Chinese banking system comprise, first, the interbank bilateral exposures are significantly lower relative to their outside assets despite the interbank markets closely connect the banks togehter. Second, most Chinese commercial banks maintain sound and relatively high levels of the net worth. Third, the model of profits earning for Chinese commercial banks mainly depends on the spread between the interest rates for loans and deposits, hence, their main activities are retail banking, which reduces the demand for interbank transactions. Fourth, Chinese interbank market is underdevelopment, and the instruments for transactions are few. These limit the size and scope of Chinese interbank markets.
Nevertheless, the losses of Chinese banking system arising from an initial bank failure through the channel of the banks network are not trivial (Table 5 ). In the extreme case when the ICBC fails with a 100% LGD ratio, the total losses of the banking system reach 6,558.87 billion yuan, which accounts for 4.76% of the total assets held by Chinese commercial banks (excluding the rural commercial banks and foreign commercial banks) at the end of 2015. In addition, we calculate the possibility of the failure of any bank i given the assumed three defaults scenarios according to equation (3), in contrast with the results from the above round-by-round algorithm. The results in Table 6 show that all the banks are immune to the failure of the ICBC. This is consistent with the results from the round-by-round simulation.
Robust Tests
We conduct robust tests using the balance sheets data of our sample at the end of 2014.
We apply two approaches and obtain similar results. Based on the limitation of space, we do not present the results of our robust tests, which are provided on the request. 
Conclusion
Relying on the balance sheet data of Chinese commercial banks, we examine the contagion effects and systemic risk in China's interbank market. Two approaches are employed in our study: one only uses the balance sheet variables without considering the detailed topological structure of the interbank network; another one needs to estimate the bilateral exposures matrix. The simulation results from two methods are consistent, and both suggest that the domino effects of Chinese interbank networks arising from an assumed bank default are minimal, whereas the amplification effects (snowball effects) of losses through the channel of interbank networks are non-trial.
Comparing two methods, we feel that the former is straightforward and insightful, and the latter is more intuitive and extensively applicable, helps analyse the microstructure of the banking system and the transmission channels of financial contagion in the banking system.
In particular, using a relative contagion index, we identify the systemic important banks for China. The measures that capture the topological features of the interbank networks by applying k-clique, partition and hierarchical clustering techniques support our identifications.
Despite the possibility of financial contagion in China's banking system is trial, the systemic losses stemming from a hypothetical bank failure due to the financial network are non-trivial. Thus, the systemic risk in Chinese interbank markets should attain proper concern by the policy makers and prudential regulators. 
